We investigate candidates of finite random variables for c-secure random fingerprinting codes, in viewpoints of both code lengths and required memories. We determine, under a natural assumption, the random variables with the minimal number of outputs (i.e. optimal in a viewpoint of memory) among all candidates, by revealing their deep relation with theory of Gauss-Legendre quadrature (a famous method for approximating definite integrals by finite sums). Our proposal also reduces the code lengths significantly; e.g. it is asymptotically about 20% of Tardos codes. Moreover, any innocent user is unlikely to be falsely accused by our code, even if the collusion is larger than the setting. These properties make our codes more desirable for a practical use.
Introduction
As the amount of commercial or secret digital objects (e.g. movies, musics, customers' data) grows rapidly, nowadays several serious information leakage and spreads of illegal copies have been reported as well. Many of them were in fact caused by users who obtained the object in a right manner but redistributed it without permission. Although to prevent such leakage is a basic requirement for digital rights managements, doing this physically is difficult in general. Instead, fingerprinting codes enable us to detect the "pirates" (guilty users) after a leakage is found (see Sect. 2.1 for detail), so it would provide a strong deterrent to such leakage. Thus studying fingerprinting codes is now one of the hot topics in branches of digital rights managements and information security.
One of the main threats for fingerprinting codes is so-called collusion-attack by two or more pirates. A fingerprinting code robust against up to c pirates is called c-secure. Some preceding schemes [5, 8, 12] used certain random variables to construct c-secure codes; their performance depend highly on these random variables, and suitably chosen ones often provide better properties than deterministic codes. It is therefore significant to investigate good random variables.
For example, c-secure Tardos random fingerprinting codes [12] have lengths of optimal order (with respect to c) among all c-secure codes. However, Tardos codes seem not to be desirable for a practical use in the following reason. First, his code uses continuous random variables, which cannot be implemented explicitly and so must be approximated in finite accuracy, but the effect of such approximation to the security property has not been investigated. Moreover, even if we accept such approximation without proofs, his scheme requires us to store the same number of the approximated random values (which would have high accuracy and so need a large number of digits in their expression) as the code length. Therefore the amount of required memories becomes too huge.
To solve this problem, Hagiwara-Hanaoka-Imai [5] recently proposed variant of Tardos codes based on finite random variables (HHI codes). Then it is enough to record the labels of the random values only, so the amount of required memories is dramatically reduced. They proposed the explicit random variables for c ∈ {2, 3, 5}, which also reduces the code lengths to about 60% of Tardos codes. However, any construction of suitable random variables, and even any proof of their existence, for a general c have not been given. In addition, HHI codes (as well as Tardos codes) require some calculation of irrational numbers for detecting the pirates, which make the implementation of the codes more difficult.
Our proposal consists of three parts. First, we construct finite random variables for c-secure HHI codes explicitly for any c. Our construction has deep relation with the theory of Gauss-Legendre quadrature, that is a well-established approximation method for definite integrals (see e.g. [11] ). Our random variables are unique ones with the minimal numbers of outputs among all candidates satisfying a certain natural assumption, so these are optimal in a viewpoint of memory. Secondly, we improve the formula of code lengths given in [5] ; we show that, for any c ≥ 4, the new formula provides shorter lengths (e.g. asymptotically about 20% of Tardos codes) than the original (asymptotically about 80% of those) when it is applied to our random variables. We also discuss that our codes are also shorter than two other recent improvements of Tardos codes [7, 10] . Finally, we show that even if all the values appeared in a practical use are approximated by finite decimal fractions, the provable security is still guaranteed by modifying the code lengths slightly.
Preliminary for Our Proposal

Our Model for Fingerprinting Codes
Before stating our results, we explain our model for fingerprinting codes. A distributor would like to distribute his digital object to users but not to anyone else. A pirate is a malicious user trying to leak the object he received without being detected that he caused the leakage. To find the pirate, the distributor embeds a fingerprinting codeword corresponding to each user into the object. In this paper, the codeword c i = (c i,1 , c i,2 , . . . , c i,n ) of i-th user u i is a binary sequence of a fixed length n. Thus a leaked object will contain some codeword y (false codeword); it is hoped that the pirate can be detected by comparing y and all users' codewords with overwhelming probability. We always regard y as having length n as well, by allowing y to have some unreadable bits denoted by '?'. It is usually assumed that the codewords are suitably hidden and encrypted, so a single pirate cannot either modify or recognize any bit of his codeword.
However, two or more pirates may collude to find difference of their codewords by comparing them (so recognize the corresponding bits) and to forge the false codeword to escape from the pursuit of the distributor. Given codewords c i 1 , . . . , c i ℓ of ℓ pirates, we say that j-th bit is undetectable if c i 1 ,j = c i 2 ,j = · · · = c i ℓ ,j ; and detectable otherwise. Namely, we assume that pirates can recognize or modify the detectable bits only. This observation is summarized as the following Marking Assumption, which has been widely considered in preceding works:
Marking Assumption: We have y j ∈ {0, 1, ?} if j-th bit is detectable by the ℓ pirates u i 1 , . . . , u i ℓ , while y j = c i 1 ,j if j-th bit is undetectable.
Moreover, we also put the following assumption on pirates' knowledge: Pirates' Knowledge: Pirates have no knowledge about innocent (not in collusion) users' codewords, so y is independent of those codewords.
After a leaked object is found, the distributor tries to detect at least one of the pirates by a tracing algorithm. It is desirable to decrease the probability of the tracing error (i.e. to output either no pirate or some innocent user); a fingerprinting code is called c-secure if the error probability is negligibly small whenever there are indeed up to c pirates.
Basic Construction of HHI Codes
Here we summarize the basic construction of HHI codes [5] . One of our contributions is to give an explicit construction of the appropriate random variables P used in the following construction.
First Phase. The distributor chooses p j , 0 < p j < 1, independently for every 1 ≤ j ≤ n according to a random variable P given in a certain manner. The sequence P = (p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n ) should be kept secret.
Second Phase. He decides the codeword c i of i-th user u i in the following probabilistic manner: P rob(c i,j = 1) = p j and P rob(c i,j = 0) = 1 − p j for j-th bit. All the bits c i,j should be chosen independently.
Tracing Algorithm. When a false codeword y is given, the distributor assigns to u i a score S i calculated by 
Summary of Results
We construct explicitly finite random variables leading c-secure HHI codes [5] for any c (see Sect. 2 for our model of fingerprinting codes and basic construction of HHI codes). The resulting codes have lengths of optimal order O(c 2 log(N/ε)), where N is the total number of users and ε is a bound of the error probability. We also improve the formula of code lengths given in [5] ; our new formula provides shorter lengths than both the original formula and other preceding probabilistic c-secure codes [8, 12] (see Fig. 1 above) .
It is worth noticing that our c-secure codes (as well as [5, 12] ) are almost false-charge free (cf. [9] for terminology), in the sense that even if either there are more than c pirates or pirates can break the Marking Assumption, the probability that at least one innocent user is accused is kept negligibly small. This property is highly desirable, since falsely accusing an innocent user would cause fatal problems in many applications.
Moreover, we analyze the effect of approximations of the above bitwise scores S (j) i by finite decimal fractions, which is necessary in a practical use (such a problem has not been considered in [5, 12] ). We choose the code length and threshold so that each S 
For the Case c ≤ 10
Our random variables P = P L c for c = 2, 4, 6, 8, 10 are given in Table 1 , where p and q denote the outputs of P and corresponding probabilities, respectively. (For odd c ≤ 9, it suffices to use (c + 1)-secure codes.) These P are all symmetric, i.e. P takes the values p and 1 − p with the same probability.
We determine the code length n and the threshold Z suitably, by considering approximations of the scores S 
where A 1 = ⌈118.2412 log(N/ε)⌉ and A 2 = ⌈86.7102 log(N/ε)⌉ (here ⌈a⌉ denotes the smallest integer m with m ≥ a). Note that now Z is an irrational number, while the scores S are integers, so it suffices to calculate the integer part ⌊Z⌋ of Z only; i.e. we have S ≥ Z if and only if S > ⌊Z⌋. For other c, we approximate the bitwise scores with error < 10 −5 , as in Table 2 . Now n and Z are given by
where A 1 , A 2 and R are listed in Table 3 . If c = 4, then Z can be precisely expressed by finite decimal fractions. On the other hand, if c ∈ {6, 8, 10}, then Z is irrational but the scores S (approximated by using Table 2 ) are finite decimal fractions with at most five digits after the decimal point. Thus we may stop the calculation of Z at the fifth digit after the decimal point; putting the resulting value as Z ′ , we have S ≥ Z if and only if S > Z ′ . [8] are longer than Tardos codes.) For example, our code length is approximately 1/2 or less of Tardos code if c = 2, and 1/3 or less of that if c = 10. A further comparison will be given in Table 6 (see Sect. 5), where Case 2 refers to our proposal.
For General c
From now, we generalize the above argument to arbitrary c. Let
It is well known (see e.g. [11] ) that all the zeros are distinct and lie in the interval (−1, 1). Then we define P = P L c for c = 2m, which are referred to as Gauss-Legendre symmetric random variables (GL SRVs), by
(which means that P L 2m takes the value 1+x 2 with probability
See Table 4 for small c. (Note that P 2 and P 3 given in [5] are P L 2 and P L 4 , respectively; while P 5 in [5] is not a GL SRV.) This name originated from the fact that X L m and w(x) are the nodes and weights for the Gauss-Legendre quadrature, that is a well-known approximation method for definite integrals by finite weighted sums [11] . It is shown in Sect. 7 that GL SRVs are the unique random variables with the minimal numbers of outputs among all candidates, under a certain natural assumption called c-indistinguishableness in [5] . In other words, GL SRVs are optimal in a viewpoint of memory required to record them.
Let p 0 be the smallest output of P = P L c , and put R = E p∈P p(1 − p) (where E denotes the expectation value) and r(t) = e t −1−t t 2 for t > 0. Let x 1 , x 2 be the unique positive numbers such that
. Moreover, let δ ≥ 0 denote the bound of approximation errors for bitwise scores (1 − p)/p and − p/(1 − p) (in Sect. 3.1, we put δ = 0 if c = 2 and δ = 10 −5 if c = 4, 6, 8, 10). Then the length and threshold are given by
where, for i = 1, 2, This formula is an improvement of that given in [5] . Figure 1 (lower curve) presents the percentages of our new code lengths relative to Tardos codes. Here we put δ = 0 for simplicity; and since the percentage depends on values of ε and N as well as c, the maximal values for every c are plotted. This shows that our codes have lengths significantly shorter than Tardos codes. Figure 1 (upper curve) also shows the percentages of the code lengths with respect to the original formula. This shows that the original formula provides longer lengths than the improved one, but it is still better than Tardos codes.
In particular, we prove the following results on asymptotic behavior of our code lengths in Sect. 8. 
Remarks on Relations with Recent Works
Very recently,Skorić et al. [10] and Isogai et al. [6, 7] also studied Tardos codes and proposed some improvements. In [10] , they investigated certain large class of c-secure random codes, including Tardos codes, and concluded that the lengths of c-secure codes in their scope cannot be shorter than 4π 2 c 2 ⌈log(N/ε)⌉. Moreover, by using Gaussian approximation for distributions of users' scores, they suggested a possibility of the lengths to attain 2π 2 c 2 log(N/ε) asymptotically due to sharpest estimate of error probability. Since π 2 ≈ 10, Theorem 3.1 shows that our codes are breaking the former limit and almost realizing the latter one.
On the other hand, in [7] and its consequence [6] , they reduced code lengths of Tardos codes by improving sharply the estimate of the error probability and then the choices of several parameters (note that they used some case-by-case numerical calculation to decide their parameters, so uniform description of their choice was not given clearly). They gave approximated values of new code lengths for some cases N = 10 9 , ε = 10 −6 and c ∈ {4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128}, as in Table 5 . Our code lengths are shorter than those in [7] , but [6] , which was proposed after the previous version of this paper, provides shorter lengths than ours in these six cases. However, our code length is still shorter than [6] when c is sufficiently large (see the rightmost column of Table 5 ); the result in [6] thus suggests the possibility that our code length can be reduced further by some sharper argument. This will be a subject of our future research.
Finally, note also that all of these related works focused on codes constructed from continuous random variables only, so the problems of implementation and of memory amount still should be concerned even if the code lengths are significantly reduced.
Properties of HHI Codes
Before discussing the code lengths, here we summarize properties of c-secure HHI codes [5] . Their codes follow the basic construction in Sect. 2.2 with the random variables P (called SRVs in [5] ) which are finite and symmetric, i.e. P takes the values p and 1−p with the same probability. We write P = { (p 1 , q 1 ) , . . . , (p k , q k )} if P rob(P takes p i ) = q i , and then write |P| = k and p 0 = min 1≤i≤k p i . We assume 0 < p
c among those considered in [5] . 
Since a+b i=1 p i = 1, at least one of the above two inequalities must be strict, so the first claim holds. The second claim is similar.
The next theorem estimates the probability that an innocent user is accused. 
where the probability is taken over all codewords c i chosen according to P .
Remark 4.3.
1. The proof of [5, Lemma 1] is still valid even if y is an arbitrary codeword with y j ∈ {0, 1, ?}, which need not satisfy the Marking Assumption; only the required assumption is that y is independent of the codeword of u i .
2. Although [5, Lemma 1] bounds the probability P rob(S i > Z) only, the same proof yields the above stronger bound (since the inequality 1 + r 1 α 2 ≤ e r 1 α 2 with α > 0 and r 1 > 0 used in the proof actually holds strictly). Moreover, the bound holds even if Z is not the threshold but an arbitrary positive parameter, and the assumption α (1 − p)/p < x 1 in [5, Lemma 1] can be replaced by a weaker one
Secondly, the next theorem estimates the probability that no pirate is accused. 
so by Lemma 4.1, the probability that none of u i is accused is
where the probability is taken over all P , all c 1 , . . . , c ℓ and all y chosen according to P, P and the pirates' strategy, respectively. 
Code Lengths
Owing to the above properties, here we improve the formula of code lengths and thresholds given in [5] . A viewpoint for this is that we should consider the effect of approximations in calculation of users' scores by finite decimal fractions. Let δ ≥ 0 be the bound of approximation errors for users' bitwise scores, i.e. we assume S (j) − S (j) ≤ δ where S (j) and S (j) are the true and the approximated scores, respectively, of a user for j-th bit. We would like to accuse this user if and only if his approximated score S = n j=1 S (j) satisfies S ≥ Z. Now S − S ≤ nδ where S is the true total score, so it follows that S ≥ Z yields S ≥ Z − nδ and S < Z yields S < Z + nδ.
Thus to achieve P rob(u i 0 is accused) < ε 1 and P rob(no pirate is accused) < ε 2 , where u i 0 is an arbitrary innocent user, it suffices to satisfy that P rob(S ≥ Z − nδ) < ε 1 and P rob(S i < Z + nδ for all i) < ε 2 ,
where S is an innocent user's true score and S 1 , . . . , S ℓ are ℓ pirates' true scores with ℓ ≤ c. By the same arguments as Theorems 4.2 and 4.4 (see also Remark 4.3), the following conditions yield (1):
Remark 5.1. Assuming 0 < ε i < 1 for both i = 1, 2, some positive solution n, Z for (2) exists only if R ℓ,P > 0 for all ℓ ≤ c. Indeed, if R ℓ,P ≤ 0, then the coefficients of both n and Z in the second part of (2) are positive, while log ε 2 < 0. Thus we assume from now that P satisfies R ℓ,P > 0 for all ℓ ≤ c.
Remark 5.2. By Remark 4.3, the former part of (2) infers that P rob(u i 0 is accused) < ε 1 for an arbitrary codeword y with y j ∈ {0, 1, ?} which need not satisfy Marking Assumption (i.e. our code is almost false-charge free whenever ε 1 is negligibly small; see the preface of Sec. 3 for terminology).
Moreover, since n, Z and β are positive, the following conditions r(x 1 )α 2 n − α(Z − nδ) = log ε 1 and β(cβr(x 2 ) − R)n + βc(Z + nδ) = log ε 2
also yield (1), where R is chosen so that 0 < R ≤ R ℓ,P for all ℓ ≤ c. Now we determine x 1 and x 2 by 
which generalize the formula in [5] (the original is recovered by putting η 1 = 1/4, η 2 = c/2 and δ = 0). We perform further approximation to make the code length n an integer. First, choose approximated values ψ 1 , ψ 2 , x ′ 1 and x ′ 2 so that
therefore 0 < x ′ i ≤ x i . Secondly, choose A 1 and A 2 by
Finally we put
Now if we take n and Z as new code length and threshold, then by comparing (4) and (7), it follows that (1) holds with ε i replaced by e −k i where (6), as desired. Summarizing, we have the following:
Theorem 5.3. Choose δ ≥ 0, R > 0 such that R ≤ R ℓ,P for all ℓ ≤ c, and ψ 1 , ψ 2 , x ′ 1 and x ′ 2 as in (5) . Moreover, choose A 1 and A 2 as in (6) . Then by setting the code length n and threshold Z as
our code possesses the following properties:
• To calculate a user's score, we may use the approximated values S (j) of the score S (j) of j-th bit with
this user is accused if and only if
• For each innocent user, he is accused with probability less than ε 1 , even for an arbitrary false codeword y which may be assembled by more than c pirates and does not necessarily satisfy the Marking Assumption. Thus at least one innocent user is accused with probability less than 1
note that y is made by some pirate, so the number of innocent users is at most N − 1).
• No pirate is accused with probability less than ε 2 if there are up to c pirates.
Thus the total error probability is bounded by ε if we put ε 1 = ε 2 = ε/N . The formula of n and Z in Sect. 3 is derived by putting η 1 = 1/2 and η 2 = √ c/2. Note that n becomes an integer whenever A 1 and Table 1 , where we put δ = 0 if c = 2 and δ = 10 −5 if c = 2 (note that the scores can be explicitly calculated when c = 2, so no approximation is needed). Now the values R, ψ 1 , ψ 2 , x ′ 1 and x ′ 2 are calculated as in Table 6 , where Case 1 (η 1 , η 2 ) = (1/4, c/2), which follows the choice of [5] , or Case 2 (η 1 , η 2 ) = (1/2, √ c/2), which is our proposal.
Then we calculate further auxiliary values A 1 and A 2 , the resulting code lengths n, and thresholds Z as in the same table, where ε = 10 −11 and N = 100c.
How to choose optimal SRVs
Since the above formula depends on the given SRVs P, it is important to investigate good SRVs for reducing code lengths. The c-indistinguishable (c-ind) SRVs are introduced in [5] as the candidates of such SRVs, and examples of c-ind SRVs for c ≤ 5 are given there. However, examples (or even existence) of those for c ≥ 6 have not been shown; an aim of this paper is to give uniform construction of c-ind SRVs for general case. As a preliminary, here we show some useful properties of c-ind SRVs.
We begin with the definition of c-ind SRVs. See Sect. 4 for notations. This definition originated from the following observation; as the non-negative values ℓ−1 x=1 ℓ x R ℓ,x decrease, the values R ℓ,P increase and so lengths of our codes become shorter (see Sect. 5). Namely, to reduce code lengths, it is optimal to search our SRVs from c-ind ones.
Since each R ℓ,x is non-negative, a SRV P is c-ind if and only if R ℓ,x = 0 (i.e. E p∈P [f ℓ,x (p)] ≤ 0) for any 2 ≤ ℓ ≤ c and 1 ≤ x ≤ ℓ − 1. We put
This infers the following condition for c-ind SRVs.
Proposition 6.2. Let 2 ≤ ℓ ≤ c.
A SRV P is c-ind if and only if, for any
2. If ℓ is even, then (9) always holds for x = ℓ/2. Thus any SRV P is 2-ind (cf. [5, Proposition 1] ).
3. (9) holds for x = x 0 if and only if (9) holds for x = ℓ − x 0 .
Proof. For the first claim, by (8) ,
Thus the claim follows. The other claims are also straightforward by (8) .
The next lemma is a key ingredient of our argument in this section.
Proof. We put q = 1 − p for simplicity. Then
so the claim follows.
This lemma yields the following properties. First, if P is c-ind, then the somewhat complicated definition of R ℓ,P can be simplified as follows.
for any 2 ≤ ℓ ≤ c by Lemma 6.3. Now P is c-ind, so Proposition 6.2 yields R ℓ,P − R ℓ−1,P = 0, as desired.
Remark 6.5. This theorem shows that any c-ind SRV indeed satisfies the condition in Remark 5.1.
Secondly, we have the following criterion for c-ind SRVs (Theorem 6.8).
Lemma 6.6. If (9) is satisfied for two of the three parameters (ℓ,
then it is also satisfied for the remaining one.
3, so all of the three terms are zero whenever any two of them are.
By the above argument, the following wonderful property is easily derived. This generalizes Proposition 6.2(2), since any SRV can be regarded as 1-ind. Proof. By the assumption, Proposition 6.2 infers that (9) is satisfied for all parameters (c, x) and (c + 1, x 0 ), where x 0 = (c + 1)/2. Thus Lemma 6.6 and induction on k show for all k that (9) is also satisfied for (c + 1, x 0 ± k). Now we are in a position to prove the criterion. (9) is satisfied for all (c ′ , x) with 1 ≤ x ≤ (c ′ − 1)/2, then P is c-ind. (9) is satisfied for at least one (c ′ , x 0 ), then P is c-ind. In particular, P is c-ind if for each odd number 3 ≤ ℓ ≤ c ′ , (9) is satisfied for at least one (ℓ, x ℓ ).
If
Proof. By Proposition 6.7, it suffices to prove that P is c ′ -ind.
(1) Now by Proposition 6.2(3), (9) is satisfied for all (c ′ , x), so Lemma 6.6 infers that it is also satisfied for all (c ′ − 1, x). Thus the claim follows inductively.
(2) Now Proposition 6.7 shows that P is (c ′ − 1)-ind, so (9) is satisfied for all (c ′ − 1, x). Thus Lemma 6.6 infers that (9) is satisfied for (c ′ , x 0 ± 1). The remaining proof goes inductively as well as Proposition 6.7.
Remark 6.9. Proposition 6.2 can infer the following characterization of c-ind SRVs: c-ind SRVs are precisely the SRVs such that any pirates' strategy does not work to decrease the pirates' average scores. Namely, let u 1 , . . . , u ℓ be ℓ pirates with ℓ ≤ c, who try to decrease their scores by choosing good false codeword y. Now Marking Assumption prevents to modify undetectable bits; while if j-th bit is detectable and they choose '0' or '?' as y j , then this bit does not contribute to reduce the scores since the bitwise scores are all zero. Thus the essential case is that j-th bit is detectable and pirates choose '1' as y j . Let B I (where I ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , ℓ}) denote the event that c i,j = 1 for all i ∈ I and c i,j = 0 for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , ℓ} \ I, which occurs with probability p j x (1 − p j ) ℓ−x (where x = |I|) when p j is fixed. Then, since we assumed that the value p j is secret for pirates and all bits are independently chosen, it follows that the probability of y j to be 1 does not depend on p j under the condition that B I occurs. Thus, when B I occurs and y j = 1, the conditional expected value of the sum of their scores for j-th bits taken over all possible choices of p j is
Hence Proposition 6.2 infers that the above value is zero for all I if and only if P is c-ind.
Constructing c-Ind SRVs from Quadrature Rules
In this section, we give a uniform construction of c-ind SRVs. For this purpose, we establish some relationship between c-ind SRVs and certain quadrature rules (i.e. approximation methods for definite integrals by finite weighted sums of values of integrands; see Definition 7.1 below). In particular, our c-ind SRVs will be obtained from Gauss-Legendre quadrature, which is a famous quadrature rule based on properties of Legendre polynomials.
We start with the following definition.
Definition 7.1. We say that a pair Q = (X, w) of a finite subset X of the interval (−1, 1) and a positive function w > 0 on X is a quadrature rule (QR) of order m and degree d if |X| = m and the following conditions are satisfied:
The elements of X are called nodes and the values w(x) are called weights.
Note that x∈X w(x) = 2 for any QR (put P (t) = 1). The next theorem asserts that c-ind SRVs are in one-to-one correspondence with the QRs of degree c − 1.
On the other hand, for a c-ind
Then P(Q) is a c-ind SRV, Q(P) is a QR of degree c − 1, and Q(P(Q)) = Q and P(Q(P)) = P.
Proof. For P(Q), it is easy to show that P = P(Q) is a SRV, so it suffices by Theorem 6.8 to prove that
), the assumption infers that
for the last equality). On the other hand, for Q(P), a similar argument shows that, for 2 ≤ ℓ ≤ c,
is indeed a QR of degree c − 1, since any polynomial of degree at most c − 1 is a linear combination of 1 and g ℓ,1 1+t 2
The remaining claim is straightforward (note that x∈X w(x) = 2 and p∈P q p = 1).
Remark 7.3. Since t 2d+1 is an odd function, it follows easily that any QR of even degree 2d is also a QR of degree 2d + 1. This observation together with Theorem 7.2 yields another proof of Proposition 6.7.
From now, we apply the above argument to the Gauss-Legendre quadrature, which is one of the most famous and well-established quadrature rules. First we summarize the theory of Gauss-Legendre quadrature. It is well known that all the m zeros of the m-th Legendre polynomial L m (t) = 
(see [11, Sect. 15.3] 
is a QR of order m and degree 2m − 1. Moreover, L m is the unique QR of degree 2m − 1 and order at most m. Now we have the following main result by combining Theorems 7.2 and 7.4.
We refer to the SRVs P L 2m as Gauss-Legendre SRVs (GL SRVs). The nodes and weights of L m for small m are found in literatures (see Table 7 for m ≤ 5). The result in Sect. 3.2 is then derived by applying the results in Sect. 5 to P L 2m .
Further Analysis of Code Lengths with Gauss-Legendre SRVs
In this section, we analyze the lengths of our codes constructed from the GL SRVs P L c given in the previous section. Figure 1 and Theorem 3.1 in Sect. 3.2 are derived from the results in this section. 
Preliminary
Our result will be derived from some properties of the Legendre polynomials L m (t) and the Bessel function J 0 (t) = ∞ k=0 (−1) k t k /(k!) 2 , so first we prepare those properties and give some consequences. Let x ν,m denote the ν-th zero of L m (t) for ν = 1, . . . , m, and let 0 < θ m < π satisfy x 1,m = − cos θ m . Let j 1 be the smallest positive zero of J 0 (t). In our argument, we need the following preceding results. for all m .
([3, Corollary 1]) We have
for all m ≥ 1 and 1 ≤ ν ≤ m.
By using these results, we have the following bound for R ℓ,P . 
Then we have the following property.
Conclusion
We proposed the first explicit, uniform construction of random variables used in the scheme of c-secure HHI fingerprinting codes [5] , by using theory of Gauss-Legendre numerical quadrature. Our random variables are in fact optimal among all candidates in a viewpoint of memory to record the variables. We also reduced the code lengths significantly, e.g. to about 20% of Tardos codes asymptotically, by improving the formula given in [5] , and analyzed the effect of approximations in the tracing algorithm to the security property. These results make our codes more desirable in a practical use.
